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WILL MORTGAGE LAW
SURVIVE?
A COMMENTARY AND CRITIQUE ON
MORTGAGE LAW'S BIRTH, LONG LIFE, AND
CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR ITS DEMISE
Morris G. Shankert

PROLOGUE

Recent reports that mortgage law may soon die are not exaggerated! 1
Present day mortgage law has been with us for four centuries.
It originated in the seventeenth century when equity took it over
from the common law courts. Equity applied to mortgages its arsenal of equitable principles, particularly those limiting forfeitures
of property. It then built upon these principles to develop a set
that was unique to mortgages. The foundational principle prohibited the clogging of the debtor's (mortgagor's) equity of redemption. 2 Essentially, this prohibited the mortgagee from retaining
any interest in the mortgagor's property once the underlying debt
had been paid.
In the last two or three decades, however, this fundamental
equitable principle has been dealt what might be mortal wounds;
notably, by the amending of Section 211 of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA") in 1983, and by the adoption of Sect Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
I Obviously, a distortion of Samuel Clemens's (Mark Twain) famous telegram stating
that reports of his death were grossly exaggerated.
2 Do not be troubled if you do not understand, or, indeed, have never heard of these anticlogging rules. I suspect that many readers, including the lawyers, have not. At least, this has
been my personal perception based on my discussions with many lawyers. Just why this is so is
puzzling, particularly since mortgages are so widely used. Query, could it be due to the fact that

most lawyers in the last several decades have never taken a mortgage course in law school, at
least one directed to a study of the fundamental principles of mortgages as opposed to the mortgage's practical use in land development?
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tion 3.1(c) of the Restatement of Mortgages (hereafter Restatement) in 1996. 3 Both of these would nullify the basic anticlogging rule. The arguments used to justify these proposals are, I
will argue, seriously flawed and based upon a misunderstanding of
the basic purpose and thrust of the anti-clogging rules. The proponents of the proposals have misread the relevant legal history, and
failed to consider commercial and societal principles that are still
fully accepted. I will also argue that if these proposals become
widely adopted by the courts and the legislatures, the unique body
of law called mortgages will be dead.
If this bothers or intrigues you, read on. The background that
led to all of this will be explicated. This first requires an understanding of the unique historical developments that led to present
day mortgage law.
I. SOME HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS 4

A. What's in a Name?
What name should be used to describe a device, which has
played a major role in improving our economy and society? The
device to which I refer has been instrumental in making possible
the construction and/or purchase of just about every home. Businesses use the device to obtain property. And when the properties
or homes have been obtained, the device is instrumental in obtaining credit needed to operate the business, or to serve the homeowner's personal needs.
How about calling this device a "Dead Pledge"? Surprised?
In fact, that is the name which has been given to this valuable device. More precisely, "Dead Pledge" is the literal translation of
the French word "mortgage" which, of course, is the device I have
been describing.
French was the official language of the English kings following the Norman Conquest, and it was at that time when the word
"mortgage" came into being. While English has long since re- See infra Part II.A-C.
4 More complete histories of mortgage law can be found in many sources.

Many are
cited or referred to in GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 2-31 (2d
ed. 1970). 1 have relied extensively upon this treatise in preparing this historical background.
Abbreviated histories of mortgage law are also found in many sources. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997); Jeffrey L. Licht, The Clog on the
Equity of Redemption and Its Effect on Modern Real Estate Finance, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
452, 458-62 (1986); Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the
Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599 (1999); Lou J. Viverito, The Shared Appreciation
Mortgage: A Clog on the Equity of Redemption, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 131, 144-49 (1982).
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placed French as our official language, the use of the name mortgage, literally meaning "Dead Pledge," had become so widespread
that the "mortgage" label has been incorporated into our English
vocabulary. But why such a morbid, depressing, and seemingly
inappropriate word to describe such a useful and needed device?
The explanation is simple. The mortgage transaction in those
early days was, indeed, a depressing one from the mortgagor's
point of view. To be more specific, lending on the security of
property in those early days was by way of pledge - gage in
French - whereby the property was physically transferred to the
creditor. Two different kinds of gage (pledge) arrangements were
available: one was the "Live Pledge," or in French, the vif gage;
the other was the "Dead Pledge" - in French, the mort gage.5 Under the vif gage (Live Pledge), the secured creditor (pledgee) in
possession was required by the underlying lending contract to use
the rents, products, and profits from the pledged property to reduce
the debt. However, in the mort gage, the secured party had no
such requirement.6 Rather, he simply kept those rents, products,
and profits as his own; and this was in addition to having the right
to collect the full amount of the debt. 7 It was the mort gage, the

Dead Pledge, which was overwhelmingly used and thus it was that
name, mortgage, which survived.
One wonders why the mort gage rather than the vif gage became the dominant transaction. Surely, borrowers would have
preferred the vif gage. Perhaps we can speculate that it was because the lenders in those early days typically had the superior
bargaining power.8 (Query, is it much different today?) 9 It was
the lender who had the money which the borrower needed, or
wanted. Thus, typically, it was the lender who could dictate the
terms of the lending arrangement. Obviously, the lenders pre- OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 1, at 2-3.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id.
I Professor McGovern cites many authorities for this proposition, going back to the Bible, Proverbs 22:7, which states: "[T]he rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the slave
of the lender." William M. McGovern, Jr., Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the
Availability of Credit: A HistoricalPerspective, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 141, 142 (1979).

In 1851.

the U.S. Supreme Court also noted the "numerous cases reported in the books [where borrowers] ... have submitted to the dictation of the lender under the pressure of their wants." Russell
v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 152 (1851).
9 A modem author, one apparently well-versed in mortgage lending, recently wrote: "Although the vast majority of lenders are ethical and problems involving dishonesty seldom occur,
the borrower is, nevertheless, likely to be at a serious bargaining disadvantage. Moreover,
negotiations between financial professionals and amateurs rarely produce results favorable to
the consumer." Viverito, supra note 4, at 142.
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ferred and chose the mort gage, not the vif gage, and thus it became the dominant transaction.
B. An Anachronism - No More Dead Pledges
Curiously, while the name "mortgage" has persisted to the
present day, most of us, even though much involved in mortgage
transactions, have never actually seen a "Dead Pledge," the arrangement by which the mortgagee who took possession and control of the property could retain the rents, produce, and profits
thereof to his own use. Indeed, for the past four hundred years,
such a contractual arrangement was illegal, or, more precisely,
inequitable. Why? Because a right to the profits produced from
property is a partial interest in that property. But, recall, the equitable anti-clogging rules barred contractual clauses that permitted
the creditor (mortgagee) to retain any of the debtor's property interest after the mortgagee had been paid in full.
Thus, since the seventeenth century when equity took over
mortgage law, the original Dead Pledge transactions have been
illegal; only vif gages, not mort gages, have been permitted. Stating it otherwise, equity required any mortgagee who took possession or control of the property to strictly account for the rents, produce, and profits of that property;' 0 they must be applied either to
the necessary expenses of maintaining and preserving the property,
or to the reduction of the secured debt. Any attempt by the mortgagee to pocket the rents, profits, or produce for his own personal
benefit was not tolerated."
Dead Pledge arrangements were not the only techniques used
by mortgagees to obtain rights in the mortgagor's property even
though the underlying debt was paid in full. There were others.
But one technique that became quite common was a contractual
arrangement under which the mortgagor entirely forfeited his
property to the mortgagee unless the mortgagor
paid the underly2
ing debt precisely on the stated due date.'
C. The Common Law Mortgage
Indeed, this arrangement became the central feature of what
evolved into the common law form of mortgage, which existed and
was enforced by the common law courts from the fourteenth to the

0

OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 9, at 19.

SViverito, supra note 4, at 144.

12 Id. at 144-45.
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seventeenth century.' 3 In the common law form of mortgage, the
mortgagor, at the inception of the transaction, granted an immediate fee title transfer of the collateral to the creditor, which was
nullified only if the debt was paid precisely on the due date (which
became know as "law day").' 4 The pre-seventeenth century common law courts enforced this term literally. This obviously
pleased the mortgagees, particularly since, according to Littleton,
payment on the due date was highly doubtful.' 5
The fact that the debtor was willing or capable of making
payment shortly after the original due date, with appropriate additional interest, was irrelevant to the common law courts. Nor did it
make any difference if the debtor's failure to make payment exactly on the due date was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's
control, such as illness, floods which had washed out the roads,
etc. As the common law courts viewed it, freedom of contract was
paramount. The parties had "agreed" to their bargain, and the preseventeenth century common law courts enforced its terms literally
and precisely.
D. Equity Takes Over
Such forfeitures of the debtor's property began to trouble the
chancellors in the early seventeenth century who then wrested
mortgage law away from the common law courts in order to give
appropriate relief.' 6 And, as previously stated, the chancellors then
developed a distinct body of equitable principles, most of which
still exist, which thereafter governed mortgages. 17
Thus, mortgage law, following the seventeenth century, became a unique and separate body of equity law. In fact, prior to
the seventeenth century, there really was no separate body of
mortgage law. Lenders and their borrowers were governed by the
general principles of conveyance law and general contract law: in
other words, bound by the literal terms found in the mortgage contract, which usually meant bound by terms that the party with the
superior bargaining power placed in the contract. Typically, that
party was the lender, who, under the then existing "freedom of
See id.
Id. at 144.
'1 "[lit is doubtful whether the feoffer [mortgagor] will pay at the day limited * * *; and if
he doth not pay, then the land * * * is taken from him for ever ...." OSBORNE, supra note 4,
§ I, at 3 (quoting SIR THOMAS LITILETON, THE TENURES § 332 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., John
Byme & Co. 1903)).
13

14

1 See OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 6,at 12.
17 See Tracht, supra note 4, at600-01.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

contract" rules, imposed pretty much whatever terms he wished
upon the borrower who wanted the money, and in many cases desperately needed it.
This often brought about what most of us today would consider unconscionable arrangements. These were brought to an end
in the seventeenth century by the equity courts through anticlogging and related rules.
E. Basic Mortgage Jurisprudence
Many explanations have been proposed to explain why equity
developed these unique mortgage rules, rules that often ignored
and, indeed, overrode the clearly expressed statements found in the
mortgage agreement. (This was true despite the parol evidence
rule, which normally prohibits one from contradicting the language
of a written finalized contract.) 8 In essence, the driving force for
these rules was equity's willingness, unlike the common law courts
before them, to look at the substance of the transaction, and not be
bound by the language of the mortgage agreement, which often
masked its substance. Professor Osborne's words succinctly captured this central idea when he wrote:
[T]o a modem mind, [there] would seem a perfectly good and
obvious reason, namely, that the mortgagee's right was only
to the payment of his debt and the property was merely security for that purpose; and, since that was so, it would be a forfeiture to allow the mortgagee to keep it absolutely if the
mortgagor was willing to pay even though the payment was
somewhat belated. 19
In other words, equity recognized that, no matter what the
mortgage instrument said, the mortgage transaction at bottom was
a debtor-creditor relationship; the mortgagor was a debtor who
owed money to his creditor, the mortgagee. As a creditor, the
mortgagee was entitled to be repaid the amount due him with appropriate interest. Once the mortgagee creditor was paid, then,
comparable to full payment by any debtor to his creditor, the relationship between the parties was terminated; the creditor (mortgagee) no longer had any further rights either against the debtor
(mortgagor) personally, or to the property which had been collat"1 See OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 6, at 13-15.
For a particularly good explanation for this
equitable approach see Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116, 125 (1859) (allowing parol evidence to
show that a deed absolute on its face was intended to be a mortgage).
19OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 6,at 13.
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erally offered by the debtor (mortgagor) for the limited purpose of
securing the repayment of the debt. 20 Further, any attempt or language in the mortgage contract that sought to violate this fundamental principle was declared illegal and unenforceable. As the
equity courts labeled it, these were unlawful clogs on the debtor's
equity of redemption, i.e., the debtor's inviolable equitable right to
redeem his collateral by full payment of the underlying debt.2'
To implement this fundamental policy, equity developed several rules to meet the different situations that presented themselves. But, to repeat, the basic anti-clogging rule which equity
developed was that anything in the mortgage contract which permitted the mortgagee to retain any interest in the mortgagor's
property following full payment of the underlying debt was ineffective.
As a necessary corollary, equity also decreed that the mortgagor's right to fully redeem all of his property by paying the debt
(including appropriate interest for any late payment) could not be
cut off by any language in the mortgage contract. The rubric that
was often used to describe this rule was that a mortgagor's equity
of redemption could not be made irredeemable.
Chronologically, it was this rule that was first used; that is,
the chancellors originally took over mortgage law by permitting a
debtor who failed to pay the mortgage debt on its due date (the law
day) to do so at a later date and still redeem the property, rather
than having it forfeited to the creditor, as was the result under the
common law regime.22 It seems fairly obvious, however, that this
simply is an application of the basic equitable anti-clogging principle, which, although articulated later in time, mandates that no
contract clause, whether dealing with payment terms or any other
terms, will be allowed if it prohibits the debtor from obtaining his
entire property, free and clear of any creditor claim to it following
full payment of the debt. Obviously, this basic anti-clogging rule
would be meaningless if mortgage clauses prohibited or severely

25 This is hardly a new or novel idea. Indeed, Osborne quotes the words of a law judge
writing in 1314: "When a man pledges tenements his intention is not to grant an estate of inheritance, but to give security for the repayment of the money he has borrowed and to redeem the
tenements; and in such case, if he repay the money he can enter." Id. at 14 (citing 3 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 130 n.5 (3d ed. 1923) (quoting Anon v. Avon, 3
Eyre of Kent, 29 Seld. Soc. 85 (1314))).
21 See Licht, supra note 4, at 459; Tract, supra note 4, at 600 n.4 (quoting JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1193 (5th ed. 1941)); Viverito, supra
note 4, at 145-46.
22 OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 6, at 12; Viverito, supra note 4, at 145.
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restricted the mortgagor's right even to make the payment of the
mortgage debt and thereby obtain full redemption of the property. 23
F. Foreclosure- A Benefit for the Mortgagee
Ironically, these anti-clogging rules, when first developed, left
the mortgagee in a bind. They seemed to permit the mortgagor to
delay payment of the underlying debt for an indefinite period of
time and then still exercise his right of redemption by a long delayed payment. Thus, at a later point in time, equity developed a
right for the benefit of the creditor (mortgagee) to deal with the
debtor (mortgagor) who failed to pay the debt on time. This was
the well-known foreclosure proceeding, namely, the right of the
mortgagee, following default in payment, to institute a foreclosure
proceeding in which the court placed a reasonable end date by
which the mortgagor had to exercise his right of redemption by full
payment. 224 Upon the mortgagor's failure to meet this deadline, his
equity of redemption was declared foreclosed, following which the
mortgagee could exercise his rights against collateral.
Originally, this permitted the creditor to retain unencumbered
title to the property, as set out by the literal words of the common
law mortgage contract. Equity then realized the unfairness of
these so-called strict foreclosure decrees, particularly where the
value of the property exceeded the balance due on the mortgage
debt. Accordingly, equity added to the foreclosure decree an order
that, if the debt was not paid by the judicially set end date, then the
property would be sold. The proceeds of the sale first went to the
creditor to retire the underlying debt. Any balance remaining, representing the debtor's equity in the property, could not be retained
by the mortgagee and was returned to the debtor. Foreclosure by
sale is now the usual decree issued by the equity courts, although
strict foreclosure is still occasionally used.25

23 It strikes me that several of the current commentators have failed to understand and assimilate these two interrelated rules, and this has contributed to our current problem. Most, it
seems, recognize the mortgagor's rights to make a late payment and still redeem his property.
They then proceed as if this is the only essential principle protecting a mortgagor, but ignore,
overlook, or downplay the more basic anti-clogging rule that prohibits any mortgage clause
(whether dealing with time limitations or otherwise) which prevents the mortgagor from redeeming all of his property free and clear of the mortgage interest upon full payment.
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997); OSBORNE, supra

note 4, § 10, at 20; Viverito, supra note 4, at 145 n.70; see Tracht, supra note 4, at 606 n.22.
25 OSBORNE, supra note 4, § 10, at 20-21.
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G. The Lenders' Counterattack
Mortgagors certainly appreciated this new equitable approach
compared to the forfeiture of their property which so often took
place under the common law regime. And, it appears that this equitable approach to mortgages has served society well, considering
that mortgages have played such an instrumental role in the astonishing economic developments of the past four centuries. 26 However, the lenders, 27 perhaps not surprisingly, never liked what equity had done to them in the seventeenth century. Throughout
these past four hundred years, they have tried to get around the
unique equitable mortgage rules through all sorts of ploys in an
effort to return to the common law "freedom of contract" regime.
These ploys included the use of clever language in the mortgage agreement that, without expressly saying so, effectively denied the mortgagor's right to redeem. Another ploy was to disguise a mortgage transaction by labeling it something else, such as
an absolute deed, or a lease, etc. Notwithstanding, these were declared to be mortgages in equity. The rubric used by the chancellors to reach this result was "once a mortgage, always a mortgage,"
or, as it is sometimes
stated, "a mortgage by any other name is still
28
a mortgage.,
The lenders, however, were pretty much stymied at every
turn. In fact, the chancellors took pride in their ability and willingness to vigorously scrutinize any transaction to determine
whether it was, in fact, a mortgage. They refused to be bound by
the actual language before them if they found it was simply a ploy
to defeat or limit the equitable rights of the mortgagor. 29 Thus, as

26 See McGovern, supra note 8, at 144 ("The last four centuries 'have seen steadily increasing indulgence to delinquent mortgagors, yet this same period has seen amazing growth in
the volume of mortgage[s],"' quoting E. DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 13 (1951)).
27 The word "lenders" does not necessarily refer to all of the lenders or any particular
lender. It is my way of describing those who historically sought to undermine the anti-clogging
rules, and in modem times have initiated or supported the proposals made in § 3.1(c) of the
Restatement and § 211 of the ULSIA.
28 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997)
("Once a
mortgage, always a mortgage ...").
29 The following judicial language was typical:
But it is not to be forgotten, that the same language which truly describes
a real sale, may also be employed to cut off the right of redemption, in
case of a loan on security; that it is the duty of the court to watch vigilantly these exercises of skill, lest they should be effectual to accomplish
what equity forbids; and that, in doubtful cases, the court leans to the
conclusion that the reality was a mortgage, and not a sale.

Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 150 (1851).
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recently as 1999, Professor Tracht in his comprehensive and incisive article wrote:
Every [creditor] effort, however ingenious, has been met by
the unyielding resistance of the courts: one may not 'clog the
equity of redemption.' The idea that the equity of redemption is an inherent and inseparable part of every mortgage is
now so commonplace, so accepted, that it elicits relatively little comment or question. 30
When the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the second half of the twentieth century began writing proposed statutes
to deal with security interests (mortgages), they acknowledged that
this firmly established law was maintained - "no mortgage clause
has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption" - and
wrote their proposed statutes to incorporate this well-established
principle. 31 This quoted language was first stated in 1952 in connection with the promulgation of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with Personal Property Security Interests and
continued through all subsequent editions of Article 9. The quoted
anti-clogging language was also restated in Revised Article 9
(which became effective in 2001), following which these additional pertinent remarks were added: "The suspicious attitudes of
the courts [toward secured parties seeking to avoid the anticlogging rules] have been grounded in common sense. This section, like former Section 9-501(3), codifies this longstanding and
deeply rooted attitude. '32 The anti-clogging language was also
found in the Uniform Land Transactions Act,33 which, in 1975,
was the Commissioners' first attempt to write comprehensive statutes on land transactions.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century (sometimes
referred to as the decades of greed), the situation changed and the
lenders, for the first time in four hundred years, scored some significant victories against the equitable "anti-clogging" rules. In
particular, as noted in the prologue, the lenders in 1983 persuaded
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to propose legislation
to repeal the essential feature of these mortgage principles,
30 Tracht, supra note 4, at 600-01; see Licht, supra note 4, at 459 (describing the historical
origin of the idea); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997)
(describing the historical common law development of the anti-clogging doctrine); OSBORNE,

supra note 4, at 12-15 (discussing reasons for and the development of the equity of redemption).
31 U.C.C. § 9-501 cmt. 4 (1972).
32 U.C.C. § 9-602 cmt. 2 (2001).
33 Unif. Land Transactions Act § 3-501 cmt. 2, 13 U.L.A. 160 (1975).
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namely, the prohibition against placing clauses in the mortgage
contract whereby the mortgagee could obtain or retain an interest
in the mortgagor's property even after the underlying debt had
been paid in full. 34 In 1993, the American Law Institute was also
persuaded to "restate" the judicial law of mortgages.35 Indeed,
these new proposals are stated in the affirmative; they expressly
authorize the mortgagee in the mortgage contract to validly bargain for an interest in the mortgagor's property, in addition to their
rights to collect the full underlying debt.
If these recommendations become widely accepted by our legislatures 36 and by our courts, then mortgage law as a unique body
of law will die; or, to use the French from which, recall, the word
"mortgage" was derived, we may be about to witness "La mort du
mortgage!"
Note well what I have said. It is mortgage law which will
disappear. However, lending on the security of property as collateral (which no doubt still will be called a mortgage transaction)
will very much continue. And, these secured lending transactions
will continue to raise many difficult questions. These will include
questions dealing with the correct filing of mortgage instruments,
and their priority versus competing interests in the same property.
There will be questions of which collateral is subject to the mortgage. Questions will also arise regarding the foreclosure procedure which a mortgagee must follow against a defaulting mortgagor in order to have the collateral applied to the debt (i.e., how to
foreclose, etc.). But, in large measure, these questions will be controlled by statutory principles based on general conveyancing and
contract law. The relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee and their rights to the collateral will no longer be governed
by those equitable anti-clogging principles that made mortgage law
a separate and unique body of law, returning us close to the "freedom of contract" regime that existed in the common law prior to
the seventeenth century.
How the lenders achieved this signal victory will now be discussed. Briefly, they were able to sell several theories and arguments, several of which, I submit, are flawed and do not stand up
34 ULSIA § 211, 7A U.L.A. 403 (1985).
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES

§ 3.1 cmt. c (1997).
At least two states, New York and California, have adopted this principle. In New
York, the statutory section validates a mortgagee's option to purchase the collateral where the
underlying loan exceeds $2,500,000. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-334 (2001). In California, an
option to purchase the collateral is valid in any mortgage of real property other than residential
buildings having four units or less. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2906 (1993).
.6
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under analysis. They were also aided by a bit of unexpected help
from the United States Congress.
II. WHAT BROUGHT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

A. The Catalysts
There were two isolated legal developments in the twentieth
century which seem to have energized lenders to renew their four
hundred year quest to overturn the anti-clogging rules which prevented them from retaining any of the mortgagor's property following payment of the underlying mortgage debt.
One was a 1967 decision from the Florida Supreme Court
which, contrary to the accepted judicial thinking, upheld an option
in the mortgage agreement to purchase the mortgagor's property
even though the mortgagee had been fully paid. 37 But the persuasiveness and authority of this decision is undermined by the dissenting judges who clearly understood what their judicial brethren
had just done. The dissent stated:
Under the rule adopted today, lenders in Florida may legally
bargain in mortgage transactions that borrowers give them
options to purchase mortgaged property during the period the
debt is outstanding. Thus under the rule of this case lenders
will be permitted to receive, in addition to repayment of the
mortgage loan with interest, the extra advantage of lopping
off the equity of redemption by the exercise of an option to
purchase. To me, this innovation opens many avenues for
overreaching and oppression. The rule against clogging, like
laws against usury, should be scrupulously maintained to insure fair dealing in the business community. Rapacious conduct and unequal bargaining in 38
the money lending field
should be frowned upon in Florida.
Notwithstanding, in a critical report to the American Law Institute,
which led to the adoption of Restatement Section 3.1(c), this aberrant Florida decision was the only case that the reporters were able
to find to support their revolutionary proposal. 39 Nevertheless, it
set the direction that the American Law Institute then followed. In

MacArthur v. N. Palm Beach Utils., Inc., 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967).
" id. at 189.
17

39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW PROP.-SEC.: MORTGAGES

No. 1, 1991).

132 (Tentative Draft
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so doing, the Institute was not "Restating" the law of mortgages.
They were "Remaking" it.
B. A FederalStatute
The second and perhaps more important catalyst came from
Congress, which in 1982 enacted the Federal Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act. 4° This statute authorized federally controlled banks to issue shared appreciation mortgages ("SAMS").
These are arrangements providing that if the mortgagor sells his
property, then the mortgagee creditor becomes entitled to a certain
percentage, e.g., twenty-five percent, of any increased sum over
the mortgagor's original purchase price realized at the sale. In
other words, the mortgagee shares in the appreciation of the property upon its sale.4'
The idea for shared appreciation mortgages apparently originated with a draft proposal, dated September 30, 1980, by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, an agency of the federal government
42
that regulated federally chartered savings and loan associations.
It was one of several proposals conceived by this federal agency to
deal with credit availability for homeowners during a period of
extremely high inflation. 43 It was soon recognized that that proposal, if adopted, could very well raise serious anti-clogging problems because it effectively transferred completely
to the mortgagee
A
a partial interest in the debtor's property.
C. The Impact of the SharedAppreciation Mortgage
Consider carefully the impact of the shared appreciation
mortgage. It permits the mortgagee to always collect the full payment of his loan no matter what happens to the value of the property. However, if the property appreciates in value, the mortgagee,
in addition, shares in the appreciation. The mortgagee, although
having this valuable ownership right, has none of the risks associated with an owner (e.g., he has no responsibility to maintain the
40

12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (2000).

41

James Cranberry & Christian Hill, Some Mortgages Firms Swap Lower Rates for Share

in the Gain When Home Is Sold, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1980, at 4 (describing appreciation
participation mortgages); Variants of Shared Appreciation Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4,
1981, at 25 (describing the different varieties of SAMS).
42 See Viverito, supra note 4, at 132.
43 See id. at 137-38. The idea for SAMs for household mortgages may have been inspired
by commercial mortgages, containing "equity kicker" arrangements, which were then also
appearing on the scene. These arrangements permitted lenders to "share in the appreciation of
the security property." Id. at 140 n.49; see also infra Part IV.
" Viverito, supra note 4, at 137-55.
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property, no responsibility to pay taxes assessed against the property, etc.). Furthermore, unlike the typical owner, the mortgagee
will not suffer any loss if the property value goes down. Under the
mortgage contract, he is still entitled to the full payment of his
debt. As a result, the mortgagee gets the benefits of ownership
when the property values appreciate, but has no duty to account for
this appreciation or to apply this appreciation to the repayment of
the debt. In principle, this appears to be not far different from the
ancient "Dead Pledges," whereby the mortgagee kept the profits of
the property for himself with no duty of accounting for them to the
mortgagor, something which has been forbidden for the past four
hundred years.45
One wonders if Congress had any inkling of what it had done
when it authorized SAMS. It appears that this particular statute
was never discussed or debated in either house of Congress; nor is
there any committee report explaining SAMS. The statute first
appeared on the congressional agenda when it was added as a new
title, Title VIII, to an entirely different statute, namely, the GarnSt. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.46 This amendment was first introduced in the Senate by Senator Garn as an unThe Senate promptly accepted Senator
printed amendment.47
Garn's request that "reading of the amendment be dispensed
with 48 and agreed to the unread and unprinted amendment.4 9
Later in the day, Senator Garn received consent that his then
unread and unprinted bill be sent to a conference committee, which
was to be notified "that the Senate insists upon its amendment." 50
The Congressional Conference Committee accepted this amendment as Title VIII of the Federal Depository Institution Act. 5' But
no committee report discusses the SAMS language, let alone explains it. The Conference Committee Report merely says that the
House of Representatives had accepted the Senate amendment. 52
The conference report, now including this brand new Title VIII
(authorizing SAMS), was then enacted by both houses of Congress, apparently without further discussion or debate.53

45 See supra Part .B.

46 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2000).
47 128 Cong. Rec. 25, 144 (1982).
49 Id.
49 Id.
50 128 Cong. Rec. 25, 175 (1982).
5' S. Rep. No. 97-641, 641 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 97-899, 899 (1982).
.52 Id.
53 id.
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One wonders if the congressmen had any idea that they were
about to undercut four hundred years of legal history, and bring
about a major change in the fundamental anti-clogging principle of
mortgage law. This statute, however, was a bonanza to the lenders
since they could now point to a federal statute that overrode the
state law of mortgages. Thus, it was easy to argue that the states
had no choice but to go along with
the federal view that had al54
ready been imposed on the states.
The lenders, however, went much further than the federal
statute, which in authorizing SAMS amounted to only a limited
dent in the anti-clogging rules. It applied only to consumer mortgages, and then only under regulations issued by the federal regulatory authorities.55 Further, it only gave mortgagees a limited
property right in the collateral, namely the right of the lenders,
upon the collateral's sale, to share in the increased value of the
collateral.5 6 But, using this as their wedge, the lenders then went
all the way. Under the Restatement Section 3.1 (c) and Section 211
of the ULSIA, lenders are authorized in the mortgage agreement to
contract to get any or all of the debtor's property.57 Thus, the basic
anti-clogging rule is not just somewhat cut back as was true with
the federal statute. It is entirely eliminated.
The rather skewed way of writing Restatement Section 3.1 is
worth noting. Subsections (a) and (b) actually seem to preserve
the debtor's right of redemption until a proper foreclosure, regardless of any language in the mortgage agreement that purports to
reduce or eliminate this right. 58 However, Subsection (c) then validates "any agreement in or created contemporaneously with the
mortgage that confers on the mortgagee an interest in mortgagor's
real estate [and such an agreement] does not violate [anything in]
54 See ULSIA, Prefactory Note, 7A U.L.A. 408 (1985) ("Residential mortgages involving
equity kickers may be less vulnerable to the clogging defense than non-residential mortgages
because, in 45 states, federal law has already preempted state limitation on the priority and
enforceability of 'alternative mortgage transactions', including transactions involving the sharing of equity or appreciation."). The laws of five states were not preempted because the federal
statute permitted states for a three-year period to opt out of its provisions. Apparently, five
states did so. Id.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2000).
56 Id.
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. c (1997); ULSIA § 211, 7A
U.L.A. 43940 (1985).
5' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:MORTGAGES § 3. l(a) (1997) ("From the time the
full obligation secured by a mortgage becomes due and payable until the mortgage is foreclosed,
a mortgagor has the right to redeem the real estate from the mortgage ....");RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1(b) (1997) ("Any agreement in or created contemporane-

ously with a mortgage that impairs the mortgagor's right described in Subsection (a) of this
section is ineffective.").
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this section. 5 9 In other words, mortgagees may contract to obtain
the mortgagor's property rights, and this is made superior to the
so-called "inviolable" redemption rules set out in Subsections (a)
and (b). 60 To put it plainly, the mortgagor, by paying the full
amount of the debt, may redeem what is left of the collateral, if
anything, following its authorized transfer to the mortgagee under
Subsection (c). 6 1 Some redemption!
D. Denial and Sidestepping by the Lenders
Those who were instrumental in bringing about this major
revolution in mortgage law refuse to admit that significant rights
of the mortgagor have been affected. The Florida Supreme Court,
in its aberrant McArthur decision, insisted that the mortgagor
debtor's equity of redemption had in no way been affected by permitting the mortgagee to exercise its option to purchase the mortgaged land. 62 According to the court, this was because the mortgagee had originally sold the land to the buyer who then mortgaged it back to the seller, now mortgagee, along with the option
to purchase.63 Accordingly, the court "reasoned" that the seller
had not sold the entire fee interest in the land to the buyer, but only
the fee interest less the option to purchase, which the seller retained. Thus, under fundamental mortgage and property law, the
buyer mortgagor could only give a mortgage on his own interest in
the land, which in this case was the full fee in the land less the
seller mortgagee's right to purchase it back. 64 With respect to that
interest, the equity of redemption remained intact. As the court
saw it, the situation was no different than an owner's purchase of
land subject to a pre-existing lease.65 The owner could mortgage
only his own rights in the land, namely, the fee interest less the
lease. Thus, the majority of the Florida Supreme Court "reasoned"
that it had not in any way affected the anti-clogging rules or the
debtor's inviolable right to redeem his property.6 6 As previously
discussed, the dissent saw through this legerdemain. 67
Comparably, the official comments to the Restatement (and
also state that their actions will not adversely affect
ULSIA)
the
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §
6" See Id. at § 3.1.

3.1(c) (1997).

61 id.
62 MacArthur v. N. Palm Beach Utils., Inc., 202 So. 2d 181, 185-86 (Fla. 1967).
61 id. at 186.
6 Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 187-90.
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long established equitable rights of the mortgagor. And why?
Because the official comments boldly assert that "the essence of
the equity of redemption is the right of a mortgagor in default to
insist on being deprived of the mortgaged real estate only by a
foreclosure process that tests its value at a public sale., 68 As this
paper already makes clear, I challenge the conclusion that this was
the essential purpose of the equitable anti-clogging rules which,
rather, assured that a mortgagor, upon payment of the mortgage
debt, shall have his property back free and clear of any mortgage
claim to it.
E. An Illusory Limitation
Nevertheless, based upon this stated rationale, the Restatement did place one limitation on the otherwise absolute power of
the mortgagee to obtain an interest in the mortgagor's property;
namely, that a property transfer to the mortgagee is ineffective if it
69
"is expressly dependent on the mortgagor default."
Even if one accepts (which I do not) the Restatement's conclusion that the essential purpose of the anti-clogging equitable
rules is to assure that a defaulting mortgagor can insist upon a public foreclosure sale, the protection given to the mortgagor by the
Restatement is illusory. It would be a foolish or uncounseled
lender who would not draft around this limitation; that is, lenders
will invariably provide in the original mortgage agreement that the
lender's right to obtain the debtor's property will arise at some
point other than default, very likely from the origin of the loan.
Indeed, the comment to Section 3.1(c) concedes this when it
states "of course, it could be argued that Subsection (c) dilutes this
right [to insist upon a public foreclosure sale] because it permits a
mortgagee to exercise the option to avoid foreclosure in any mortgagor default situation where the option language does not expressly tie exercise to default., 70 And, if this were not enough, the
Restatement's comments then set out several illustrations of language that could be used in the
mortgage contract to avoid the
7
limitation in Subsection 3.1 (c). 1

68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. d (1997).

69Id. at § 3.1(c) (1997); see also ULSIA § 211(2), 7A U.L.A. 440 (1985) (invalidating options to purchase the property if they are tied to the mortgagor's default).
7) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. c (1997).

7'See Id. at § 3.1 cmt. d, illus. 6-7.
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F. Flawed Reasoning and Misreading of History
The questionable notion that the essence of the mortgagor's
equitable rights under mortgage law was to protect the defaulting
mortgagor from being deprived of his real estate without a public
foreclosure process seems to have originated with the Nelson and
Whitman text. 72 (Professors Nelson and Whitman were also the
Reporters for this Restatement of Mortgages.) 73 At Section 3.2 of
their textbook, they articulate this rationale as the historic reason74
for developing the debtor's inviolable equity of redemption.
Nelson and Whitman cite no authority for this conclusion and, as I
have already indicated in this paper, the essential purpose of the
anti-clogging rules was not for the protection of a non-paying
mortgagor to obtain a fair price at a mortgage sale.75 To the contrary, they were developed for the protection of the mortgagor who
wishes to pay his debt, not the mortgagor who does not or cannot
make the payment. The anti-clogging rules permit payment to be
made, following which the mortgagor is assured that all of his
property will be redeemed, that is, returned to the mortgagor free
and clear of any mortgagee interest therein. And, the anti-clogging
rules guarantee that this shall be the result regardless of language
in the mortgage agreement that states otherwise. As stated by
Lord Lindley in Samuel v. JarrahTimber & Wood Paving Co.:76
Lord Hardwicke said in Toomes v. Conset: "This Court will
not suffer in a deed of mortgage any agreement in it to prevail that the estate become an absolute purchase in the mortgagee upon any event whatsoever." But the doctrine is not
confined to deeds creating legal mortgages. It applies to all
mortgage transactions. The doctrine "Once a mortgage always a mortgage" means that no contract between a mortgagor and a mortgagee made at the time of the mortgage and as
part of the mortgage transaction, or, in other words, as one of
the terms of the loan, can be valid if it prevents the mortgagor
from getting back his property on paying off what is due on
his security. Any bargain which has that effect is invalid, and
is inconsistent with the transaction being a mortgage.77

72

GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 3.27-3.30, at

94-116 (4 th ed. 2002).
73 Id. at v.
74 Id. at § 3.2.
7-1 See supra Part I.E-F.
76 [1904] A.C. 323, 326 (H.L. 1904).
77 Id. at 329.
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The Nelson and Whitman theory that the essence of these equitable rules was to protect the defaulting (non-paying) mortgagor
during the foreclosure process also overlooks certain historical
facts, namely, that the anti-clogging rules were developed by the
equity courts even before the foreclosure remedy had been invented. To repeat, the anti-clogging rules were invented to assure
that the mortgagor who was prepared, even belatedly, to pay his
debt, not to default in payment, could do so and completely redeem his property free and clear of any mortgagee claim to it. The
foreclosure rules came after this basic anti-clogging concept had
been established; and, recall the foreclosure remedy was originally
developed for the protection of the creditor (mortgagee), not the
debtor (mortgagor). It was designed to give a remedy to the creditor (mortgagee) to enforce his debt and mortgage rights, if the
debtor failed to or refused to pay.78
Further, the original foreclosure decree did not even provide
for a public sale. Foreclosure by sale remedy came later. This did,
indeed, give protection to a non-paying mortgagor. It permitted
that non-paying mortgagor whose right (equity) of redemption had
been foreclosed to receive from the sale proceeds the value of his
"equity" in the property; that is, the amount over and above the
mortgage debt.79

To repeat and emphasize, the anti-clogging rules were invented for, and then applied to, the protection of the mortgagor
who can and is willing to pay, not the defaulting debtor mortgagee
who is unwilling or unable to pay. The protection is essentially
that full payment by the mortgagor will redeem his property and
cutoff any claims that the mortgagee may assert to it. This is so,
no matter what is stated in the original mortgage agreement that
seeks to vest some or all of the debtor's property rights in the
mortgagee. 80
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A LENDERS' VICTORY
If the ULSIA and/or Section 3.1 of the Restatement were
adopted, it would return lenders close to the freedom of contract
78 See supra Part I.F.

79 See supra Part I.F.
80 See supra Part I.D-F. Nelson and Whitman were aware of this history, and also of the

leading authorities discussed in this Article which explain the impact of the anti-clogging rules.
See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 106-10, 260-66 (6th ed. 2003).

Notwithstanding,

their textbook insists that assuring a public foreclosure sale to a defaulting mortgagor constitutes
the "essence" of the equity of redemption rules. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 72, §§ 3.273.30, at 94-116.
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regime that they enjoyed prior to the seventeenth century, a position that they have been seeking to recapture for the past four hundred years. In particular, it would permit them to do what they
have long wished for, namely, to require a mortgagor to transfer
some or all of his property to a mortgagee as a condition of receiving the loan. This, of course, can prove quite advantageous to the
lender.
To illustrate what can happen in a freedom of contract regime,
consider the following two examples that involve commercial
loans with equity participation features (equity kickers). 8' Recall
that it was these arrangements that apparently inspired proposals
for something comparable in consumer loans, and eventually led to
the proposals for shared appreciation mortgages (SAMS). 82 The
two examples involve the TIAA-CREF Insurance Company
("TIAA"), a major lender. (1) In March 1991, TIAA reported that
a $10 million loan with an equity kicker resulted in full repayment
of the loan ($10 million) plus close to a $90 million gain on the
sale of the property. Even the report described this as quite a "bonanza." 83 (2) In an August 1987 report, TIAA reported that it had
made a ten-year, $9.5 million loan at 15.5% interest and, in addition, had received shares of stock and options to buy stock of the
debtor. This loan plus the equity kicker transaction had resulted
"in a net gain to TIAA of $61.2 million [from the sales of the
property], not counting interest [at 15.5% per anum] from the loan,

11Loans with so-called equity participation (or equity kickers) apparently have been fairly
common in the past several decades. See Hertzberg, supra note 43, at 41 ("Borrowers are also
giving in to lenders' demands for 'equity kickers,' or participation in the ownership and income
from mortgaged property .. . .At Prudential 'the only mortgages we are doing currently have
some form of equity participation' plus a 'a provision to revise rates upward at the end of 5
years,' says [Prudential executive vice president] Mr. Hoenemeyr."). Scholars have noted, by
reason of case law, that equity kickers may offend the anti-clogging rules. See, e.g., James D.
Cooper-Hill & Joseph J. Slama, The Convertible Mortgage: Can It Be Separated from the
Clogging Rule?, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 411 (1986) (recognizing that certain cases pose problems by invalidating purchase options); see also Samuel, [1904] AC at 329 (voiding a condition
in a loan allowing the lender to purchase stock of the borrowing company at a reduced price);
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Doerr, 303 A.2d. 898 (1973) (prohibiting mortgagee from taking
option to purchase property from mortgagor as part of original mortgage transaction). Notwithstanding, there appears to be little litigation, if any, challenging loans with an equity kicker.
Nonetheless, concern that the widespread use of equity kickers was threatened by the anticlogging rules was, I believe, a major impetus to the lenders to eliminate the anti-clogging rules.
See ULSIA, Prefactory Note 8, 7A U.L.A. 408 (1985) (explaining anti-clogging rules and stating "[i]n the modem real estate world of 'equity kickers' and convertible mortgages, the [anticlogging] doctrine poses some potential difficulties for lenders. Section 211 of this Act resolves
these issues by permitting essentially any transaction which meets the 'good faith' test of §
108").
82 See supranote 43.
8-TIAA-CREF REPORT (TIAA-CREF, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1991, at 5 (on file with
author).
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which has eight years remaining to maturity. 8 4 The report conceded that this "investment" had "paid off exceptionally well. 85
A. Lenders' Suggestionfor Equity Policing
Notwithstanding, lenders apparently had some concerns that
enacting a total freedom of contract regime might go too far, and
therefore, some limits ought to be placed upon it. Thus, while the
black letter law of Section 3.1(c) of the Restatement gives carte
blanche to the lender to obtain any or all of the mortgagor's property as part of the loan transaction,86 the official comments to the
Restatement retreat a bit. The comment states:
[I]t may, in rare instances, be desirable to protect residential
and small business loan mortgagors, whether in default or
not, from inequitable attempts by mortgagees to profit by acquiring appreciated and improved real estate by means of option exercise. Such mortgagors are apt to be unrepresented
by counsel and to be less sophisticated negotiators than their
large business counterparts. Consequently, close judicial
scrutiny in such situations may be justified ....

It is prefer-

able for courts to deal with such situations by use of their inherent discretion to deny equitable relief under harsh and inequitable circumstances.87
Comparably, the prefatory note to the ULSIA also cautions that
any transaction under Section 211 must "meet the good faith test
of Section 108. ' 8
Similar views are expressed by Jeffrey Licht, one of the early
authors to vigorously protest "the rule against clogging the equity
of redemption [which] has become a danger to the ordinary transactions of ordinary business deals., 89 Nonetheless, he apparently
concedes that there are special cases where equitable protection for
the mortgagor may be needed. He suggests that this be done under
"twentieth century unconscionability law [which] has been maturing into a legal tool that appears better designed to regulate the
original target of clogging., 90 Indeed, Licht states that the clog84 PARTICIPANT (TIAA-CREF, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1987, at 6 (on file with author).
81 Id. I have not made any exhaustive study of the results of loans with equity kickers included. I happened to receive these reports from TIAA-CREF, since I am a participant in the
pension programs which TIAA-CREF administers for many educational institutions.
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1(c) (1997).
87 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. d.
88 ULSIA, Prefactory Note, 7A U.L.A. 408 (1985).
89 Licht, supra note 4, at 497.
9 Id.
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ging doctrine essentially is "a type of per se unconscionability." 9
But he believes that modern approaches of unconscionability, apparently applied on a case-to-case basis, are a better tool for identifying those mortgage situations that do need special equitable protection. 92
Quite true, the present anti-clogging rules leave no room for
wiggle. If a mortgage contains an anti-clogging provision, it is
declared invalid. The only factual inquiry is whether a mortgagor/mortgagee relationship exists. If it does, there is no need for
further investigation into the fairness or harshness of the particular
transaction. And, I submit that there are well-accepted economic,
legal, business, and pragmatic principles that justify the unyielding
anti-clogging rules in the mortgage situation. These will be discussed later in this paper.93 But, first, a very brief critique of the
lenders' proposals for policing unfair mortgage transactions
through unconscionability and equity principles.
B. Problems with Using Unconscionability
The literature on unconscionability and good faith doctrines is
overwhelming, and I make no attempt in this paper to expose or to
analyze all of this literature. Some of the leading ideas and authorities are discussed and/or cited in the Licht article. 94 But even
a brief study of these authorities demonstrates why trying to apply
them to the mortgage situation would cause much uncertainty, and,
thereby, likely increase significantly the cost of mortgage lending,
or, possibly, even the availability of credit.
The problem arises because, as any review of modern equitable and unconscionability cases makes clear, it is difficult to predict when a court will or will not describe certain conduct to be
unconscionable and, if unconscionable, to determine what remedy
it will impose. Indeed, Licht's article, which contains a major section on the use of unconscionability in the mortgage context, helps
prove this point. 95 He summarizes the "variety of theories" and
guidelines that have been proposed to define what unconscionability might be all about.9 6 Selecting the proper theory or guideline
applicable to the given facts, and then properly applying it, would
91Id. at 483.
92 Id. at 485-86.
93 See infra Part IV.

94 See Licht, supra note 4, at 483-85 (discussing the approaches of Leff, Ellinghau, and
Eisenberg).
Y5

Id.

96 Id.
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be a challenge enough. But, the problem is aggravated since97 the
various theories are not necessarily consistent with each other.
For example, is it sufficient to conclude that because two
business persons are involved in the mortgage transaction, then
this necessarily is a fair and conscionable transaction? Some
might suggest this, yet there are many cases where unconscionability principles have been used in contracts negotiated between businesses. And, recall, even the comments to the ULSIA mentioned
that "in rare instances, it may be desirable to protect . . .small
business loan mortgagors." 98 But, query, how does one determine
how small is "small"?
Would an extraordinary gain by the lender for his loan suggest
that there may have been unfairness either in the procedural aspects or substantive aspects of this transaction? There are equitable ideas that do suggest this, but again, how does one determine
when the gain to the mortgagee is too much to be tolerated by an
equity court? And, recall also, there are even equitable theories
where equity gives relief merely to protect a party from his own
over-optimism or folly. 99
Thus, if unconscionability and other equitable doctrines proscribing unfair dealings, forfeitures, harsh results, and even equity's duty to protect one from the folly of being overly optimistic
about his future success, were substituted for the current anticlogging rules on a case-to-case basis, it will become almost impossible to predict whether a particular property transfer from
mortgagor to mortgagee is valid or not. And, the problem is aggravated since there are few, if any, precedents directly dealing
with situations today governed by the anti-clogging rules which,
recall, automatically invalidated any clog. Thus, at least for the
foreseeable future, each judge will be striking out on his own,
making "new" law with each decision. It is likely that results will
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Indeed, there may be disparity even among the judges of the same court.
One wonders whether Lord MacNaughton intuitively perceived the unsatisfactory situation for mortgage law if exceptions
were made to the anti-clogging rules. Thus, even though he personally thought that these anti-clogging rules made no sense in
97 See generally id. at 473-86 (discussing the different theories concerning the clogging
doctrine).

98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. d (1997).
" See Viverito, supra note 4, at 148; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1

cmt. a (1997) ("Equally important is a judicial inclination to protect the mortgagor against
misplaced optimism and overconfidence concerning future ability to satisfy commitments.").
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business situations, he nevertheless recognized the practical and
pragmatic need to uphold them. He stated:
[The anti-clogging rule] seems to have had its origin in the
desire of the Court of Chancery to protect embarrassed land
owners from imposition and oppression. And it was invented, I should suppose, in order obviate the necessity of inquiry and investigation in cases where suspicion maybe
probable and proofdifficult.10
Under the equity and unconscionability regime proposed by
the lenders, one thing is almost certain. There will be high, maybe
prohibitive, transaction costs just to determine if a proposed mortgage transaction with equity participation features will pass judicial muster, and should therefore be entered into by the parties.
And, if originally entered into, then the mortgagee's attempt to
enforce a property transfer to him very likely will also bring about
further high transaction costs. Obviously, when a well-counseled
mortgagor has repaid his debt in full and then realizes that he also
is about to lose his property, there is a high likelihood that that
mortgagor will raise the unconscionability defense in order to prevent the loss of his property. Litigation becomes quite likely.
Because of these many uncertainties, the transaction costs in
any mortgage regime which relies upon unconscionability and
other equitable principles to police individual cases is likely to be
quite high. 101

10Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Co., [1904] A.C. 323, 326 (H.L. 1904) (emphasis added).
101
Whenever mortgages (security interests) are subject to risk of loss, it is widely acknowledged that this will increase the cost of the transaction and, indeed, reduce the availability
of credit. See, e.g., Letter from K. King Burnett, President, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on
Unif. State Laws, to Senator Richard Durbin, Judiciary Committee (August 30, 2002), available
at http://www.abiworld.org/ulccresponse.pdf. He wrote Senator Richard Durbin of the Judiciary Committee
to express my deep reservations concerning certain provisions of the recently introduced Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 .... Section
103, as currently drafted, goes much further however, and creates huge
new risks even for secured parties with legitimate liens created in good
faith transactions, entered into in the ordinary course of business. We believe the ultimate effect of these provisions will be to increase massively
the risks to secured lenders that their security interests may ultimately be
avoided if a bankruptcy occurs, with the attendant consequence being
significantly higher cost of borrowing (and a significant reduction in
available credit compared to today) to account for this risk.
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C. The Bankruptcy Situation
One further point along this line of high transaction costs is
the uncertainty of the status in bankruptcy of mortgages with equity participation features. In their enthusiasm to adopt Restatement Section 3.1(c) and Section 211 of the ULSIA, the American
Law Institute and Uniform Law Commissioners may not have fully
considered the result in the context of a bankruptcy. Obviously, a
secured creditor needs his security most in the bankruptcy situation. (Solvent mortgagor debtors typically pay their secured, and
even unsecured, debts, and therefore, resort to the collateral is not
required.) But what will happen when that "secured creditor"
(who has an actual or potential ownership interest in the debtor's
property or enterprise) presents his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding of his mortgagor? Does this not suggest a real possibility
that the bankruptcy courts may treat him not as a creditor at all,
but as an owner, and, therefore, bar him from creditor status? Or,
possibly, to have his creditor status subordinated to other creditors? Either case typically results in no (or little) payment to that
subordinated creditor.
Whether that would be the result in the bankruptcy courts is
not definitively known. ]0 2 There is, however, a strong argument
that this "secured creditor" should not be given creditor status because of his potential or actual ownership position. If that should
happen, then when the mortgagee most needs his secured creditor
position - that is, in his mortgagor's bankruptcy proceeding - he

faces the possibility that he simply will not get it. In any case, the
present uncertainty of the outcome in bankruptcy likely will add
even more to the transaction costs of making and enforcing these
mortgages containing equity participation features.

102 There seems to be few cases specifically dealing with this subject. However, in one
case, the bankruptcy judge subordinated the creditor's claim because of the equity participation
features in the loan. In re Pac. Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 114 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). The
appellate court reversed, stating that subordination was inappropriate because the lender had
acted in "good faith" in making the loan. Id. at 118. This reasoning was criticized in a later
case which held that although a creditor's $300,000 advance to an undercapitalized debtor was
cast in the form of a loan, and was properly documented as such with a set rate of interest and
maturity date, the transaction had the substance and character of an equity investment, so as to
permit recharacterization of the alleged debt when the debtor later filed for Chapter 7 relief,
because the creditor was given pervasive control over the debtor's operation, and the right to
convert its advance into a 47% equity interest in the debtor at any time over a ten-year period.
In re At. Rancher, Inc., 279 B.R. 411,434-37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
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IV. THE ANTI-CLOGGING RULES ARE BASED ON PRESENTLY
ACCEPTED LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL FUNDAMENTALS

I have argued that the basic arguments used to support the
recommendations of the Uniform Commissioners and American
Law Institute do not hold water. They are based on a misreading
of the history of the equitable anti-clogging rules, and a flawed
analysis of what was the raison d'etre for these rules.
Nonetheless, there remains the ultimate question: Do the anticlogging rules still make sense today? Obviously, the lenders
think not. But, it strikes me that many of their arguments are little
more than slogan slinging, and that many of these slogans should
be taken with a grain of salt.
A. Slogans with Little Substance
For example, the slogan most often heard is that the anticlogging rules were developed to protect the necessitous and impoverished debtor from being overreached by the greedy creditor.
Thus, they make no sense in mortgage arrangements between sophisticated and well-counseled parties.
Undoubtedly, the anti-clogging rules have benefited many
poor landowners. But, it is naive to believe that this was the original purpose for developing the rules. Indeed, in the seventeenth
century when the anti-clogging rules were first developed, one
wonders how many impoverished debtors had sufficient property
to make a secured lending transaction even feasible. More likely,
the property owners for whom the mortgage transaction made
sense were those of title and wealth - the only ones who likely
held and owned significant amounts of property. And, indeed, the
earliest chancery case to discuss the equity of redemption was a
dispute between two titled noble persons, and involved a mortgage
loan of 2,500 pounds - a veritable fortune in 1654.103
Professor Tracht's research also supports this conclusion.
Writing in 1999, he states:
Indeed, the historical timing of the equity of redemption
seems to fly in the face of this [necessitous borrower] rational, since it arose in England at a time when loans were in-

103OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 13 (referencing Duchess of Hamilton v. Countess of Dirlton,
I Ch. Rep. 165 (1654)).
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creasingly being made to wealthy merchants rather than "necessitous men.'q 4
The conclusion, therefore, seems clear; anti-clogging rules were
not invented just to protect the impoverished, but had other underlying purposes which required that they apply to all borrowers,
including the so-called sophisticated borrowers.
Another slogan often used by the lenders is that the dynamics
of commerce today are not what they were during the past four
centuries, that the anti-clogging rules prevent credit flowing to
what are economically useful projects - projects that lenders
would be glad to finance if only
they could get an interest in the
105
debtor's enterprise or property.
I doubt that these are new insights or new arguments, and suspect that comparable arguments have been made throughout the
past four hundred years. 10 6 Obviously, the commercial and social
dynamics of the twentieth century were not the same as those of
the nineteenth century, and those of the nineteenth century were
not the same as those of the eighteenth century, etc. Indeed, there
were major changes within each century. In each era there were
quantum leaps forward in the commercial and societal dynamics
compared to the preceding eras; and each era undoubtedly had its
spokesmen insisting that the "new" societal and business needs
required a change from the "archaic" rules of the prior century.
Notwithstanding, the judges, many of whom likely were fully
aware of, and indeed, had likely participated in, the "new" business practices of their time, were unpersuaded. They invariably
rejected the explicit or implicit arguments
that the anti-clogging
10 7
rules should be abandoned or cut back.
'°4
Tracht, supra note 4,at 612.
105
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY.: MORTGAGES (1997) states:

An overly dogmatic approach to options granted to mortgagees in loan
transactions will unduly discourage the flow of capital to a variety of socially useful projects. The prospect of being able to share in the success
of the mortgagor may well induce the mortgagee to consider a variety of
techniques that afford it the opportunity to acquire equity ownership in
the mortgagor's real estate.
Id. at § 3.1 cmt. d. Much of the language in this comment seems to be taken from NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 72, § 3.2, at 40.
106
Professor McGovern states that comparable arguments have been made since Biblical
times. McGovern, supra note 8, at 143.
07
1 One documented example took place early in the twentieth century. Lord MacNaughton urged a change in the anti-clogging rules to permit financing with equity participation features to businesses who presumably would then use these loans for beneficial business projects.
He insisted that this change was needed because "the directors of a trading company in search of
financial assistance [in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries] are certainly in a very different position from that of an impecunious landowner in the toils of a crafty money-lender."
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Of course, this lenders' slogan is true. Increase the economic
benefits to lenders, whether by way of increased interest or rights
to the borrower's property, and they will increase the credit available to those who need (or want) a loan, presumably to be used for
some useful social or business activity. But this begs the fundamental question; namely, whether society should place any limits
on the quantity and quality of what lenders may demand from their
borrowers. Historically, such limits have always existed. Usury
and predatory lending laws are two examples. These anti-clogging
rules are another example of societal limits. These limits originally served important commercial and social interests, 1 8 and, as
explained later, this still remains true.
B. The Economic Argument
Most, but not all, of today's writers support the position of the
Restatement and the ULSIA. This includes many who have written on the law and economics of these lending transactions. Much
of this writing has argued that a more efficient market would be
obtained if freedom of contract were returned to the mortgage
situation; the market dynamics will work out the most efficient
result. Many of these writings are discussed and commented upon
by Professor Tracht in his comprehensive and incisive 1999 article.1°9 But Professor Tracht then concludes, contrary to other writers, that market efficiency may result through the current equitable
anti-clogging rules because they are "a mechanism for creating
efficient incentives for the lender and borrower to renegotiate the
0
terms of their contract should default occur.""1

Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Co., [1904] A.C. 323, 327 (H.L. 1904). Notwithstanding, Lord MacNaughton could not persuade his fellow judges to cut back on these longstanding anti-clogging rules. In fact, in this same decision, one of his colleagues, Lord Lindley,
wrote one of the most cogent statements explaining the anti-clogging rules and their underlying
purpose. Id.; see also Steve H. Nickles, The Objectification of Debtor - CreditorRelations, 74
MINN. L. REV. 371, 371-373 (1989) (discussing three decisions where a secured creditor's
claims were subordinated in bankruptcy because the secured creditor had overstepped the legitimate role of credit by obtaining managerial rights which in our legal and commercial systems are vested exclusively in the owners).
108
Professor McGovern cites authorities that indicate that creditors' demands for greater
rights against the debtors historically have been rejected for two reasons. He states: "First, some
remedies are rejected on grounds of 'justice' even if the result is to reduce the availability of
credit.... There is a second argument for limiting creditors' remedies, namely that harsh remedies are not in fact needed to assure the availability of credit." McGovern, supra note 8, at 14344.
IgSee Tracht, supra note 4, at 613-19.
"O Id. at 630. Professor Nickles also challenges "law-and-economic types" who insist that
legal rules
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However, it is Professor Tracht's concluding remarks that
should give all of us pause. He suggests that the current authors
may not have a complete or thorough understanding of the market
and social dynamics associated with the anti-clogging rules. Here
are his very pertinent concluding comments:
Finally, the courts' long-standing and vigorous defense of the
equity of redemption presumably reflects a deep-seated intuition that something is wrong with a waiver of redemption
rights - even if courts have been unable to articulate the
problem in a coherent fashion. As shown in this Article, the
common law rule may be rooted in an implicit or tacit understanding of important elements of market dynamics and contractual relationships, even though judges and legal scholars
have never been able to offer detailed or convincing models
of the processes at work. There is often a gap between what
we think we understand about the world, and what we can
rigorously explain about it.' '
C. The Other Dynamic: The FundamentalDebtor-Creditor
Relationship
There is, I believe, another dynamic that supports the anticlogging rules that is rarely discussed by current commentators. It
is not a new insight; it has been recognized by the courts throughout these past four hundred years." 2 This dynamic stems from the
fact that a mortgage situation, at bottom, is a lending transaction a transaction where a creditor loans money to a debtor. Essentially, the equity courts, in developing the anti-clogging rules,
were following the well-accepted principle of law, business, and
economics that distinguishes between the position of an owner and
a lender, and were insisting that a lender, upon being fully paid,
loses all further rights against his debtor and his property.

limiting creditor conduct and creditor control .... will have the effect,
ultimately, of increasing the cost of credit and reducing its availability.
• . . [Tihey will flash in front of your eyes an incomprehensible chart or
graph that, they say, linearly proves the probable reliability of economic
intuition. I have four responses that lead ultimately to the conclusion that
objectifying debtor-creditor relations so as to limit creditor control is, to a
point, desirable.
Nickles, supra note 107, at 382-83.
" 1Tracht, supra note 4, at 643. Professor Tracht thanks his colleague Vein Walker for
raising the point.
"2 See supra Part I.E.
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Stating it another way, the equity courts, in developing and
then perpetuating the anti-clogging rules, essentially ruled that one
with funds (assets) to invest in an enterprise must make a choice:
whether, with respect to those funds, to become a lender to, or an
owner of, the enterprise. If the choice is to become a lender, then
one must be satisfied with the entitlements of the lender, namely,
the right to have the loan repaid with appropriate interest. Having
elected to receive those creditor entitlements, the mortgagee is
barred from also obtaining the entitlements of an owner." 3 This
idea was expressed early when Lord Henley (later Northington
L.C.) in 1761 declared: "[tihis court, as a court of conscience, is
very jealous of persons taking securities
for a loan, and converting
14
such securities into purchases."'
Some two hundred years later, Lord Lindley, in Samuel v.
JarrahTimber & Wood Paving Co.,' 1 5 likewise stated:
The doctrine 'Once a mortgage always a mortgage' means
that no contract between a mortgagor and a mortgagee made
at the time of the mortgage and as part of the mortgage transaction, or, in other words, as one of the terms of the loan, can
be valid if it prevents the mortgagor from getting back his
property on paying off what is due on his security. Any bargain which has that effect is invalid, and is inconsistent with
the transactionbeing a mortgage.'16
And, recall,17even a law judge writing in 1314 articulated the very
same idea."
There are similar statements made in the present-day United
States. One example comes from the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
which stated in 1967 "that upon discharge of the debt . . . the
mortgagor is entitled ... to have the mortgaged premises relieved

from the lien and his entire estate restored to the extent which he
would have had if the mortgage transaction had never taken
place."'" 18 While many other authorities have expressed the same
113
Professor Nickels makes the same point. He then explains: "The owner's investment is
at risk in this sense [in an insolvency situation], while the creditor's is not, because the owner is
empowered to share in the direction and management of the enterprise and thus must bear the
consequences of her control." Nickles, supra note 107, at 381.
114Vernon v. Bethell, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 2 Eden 113 (Ch. 1761).
"5 [1904] A.C. 323 (H.L. 1904).
1111d.
at 329 (emphasis added); see also Nickles, supra note 107, at 382 ("[Cjreditors must
use collateral according to its real purpose; must use the control accompanying collateral in line
with that purpose; and ...

creditors must not abuse control - use it beyond its purposes - what-

ever the source of the control and without regard to how it is achieved.").
117
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
I "'Courseyv. Fairchild, 436 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla. 1967).

2003]

WILL MORTGAGE LAW SURVIVE?

idea, Professor Osborne succinctly captured this basic thought
when he wrote:
[T]o a modem mind, [there is] a perfectly good and obvious
reason, namely, that the mortgagee's right was only to the
payment of his debt and the property was merely security for
that purpose; and, since that was so, it would be a forfeiture
to allow the mortgagee to keep it absolutely if the mortgagor
was willing to pay even though the payment was somewhat
belated." 9
All of this is based upon a well-established doctrine in law, in
commerce, and in economics. One rarely, if ever, can assert that
the advancement of a particular sum of money to an enterprise
entitles one, at a particular time, to both to the status of a creditor
and an owner. This would seem particularly true where the investor seeks ownership status only when the property appreciates, but
not when it depreciates in value.
Our tax law insists that the dichotomy between creditor and
owner be respected since it determines the tax consequences of
distributions to that person.12 0 So does our bankruptcy law since it
determines the priority of claimants to the bankruptcy estate's assets. So, I believe, does every other area of law and business
where the problem arises. 121
Are we really prepared to blur or indeed eliminate this long
established dichotomy? Will secured lending become the first to
break this dichotomy, and, perhaps, to set the precedent for doing
so in many other contexts? This is a question that the current
commentators, until now, have not even discussed. But, I submit
that it needs to be discussed.
It strikes me that there have always been and still are good legal, business, and economic reasons for distinguishing between the
position of the lender and that of an owner. A lender has a preferred position in the assets of the debtor and the assurance of a
known rate of return (interest). His risks upon the insolvency of
the debtor are, therefore, minimized.

13.

119OSBORNE, supra note 4, at
1211
See Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
121Insurance law prohibits a creditor from insuring his debtor's life

for more than the
amount of the debt. Seeking to insure a debtor's life for more than this sum is deemed to be an
unlawful wagering contract, one which would amount to unjust enrichment to the creditor. See
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 43, 314-16 (3d ed. 2002). Thanks
to my colleague, Professor Wilbur C. Leatherberry, for bringing this point to my attention.
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On the other hand, an owner has the potential for high, possibly unlimited, profits. In return, the owner also must assume the
obligations, risks, and potential losses associated with ownership.
However, Section 3.1 (c) of the Restatement and Section 211 of the
ULSIA are structured to stand the owner's obligations and risks on
their head. In effect, these provisions will permit lenders to have
their cake and eat it too; that is, to be assured of full repayment of
their loans with appropriate interest as a lender. And, if the enterprise prospers, or the property increases in value, then these proposals permit the lender also to enjoy a part of those profits. But,
note well, they will be entirely free from the risks and burdens
imposed on an owner if the property decreases in value, or the enterprise is not profitable. In 1861, Judge Hargreave also made the
point pithily and well:
If the land had fallen in value below £4,000 [the amount of
the loan], Mr. Jackson [the mortgagee] would have insisted
on being treated as a mortgagee; but, as it has risen, he says
he is a purchaser: that is, he gets a collateral benefit over and
above his principal
and interest, which a Court of Equity
• 122
never permits.
A comparable view
was expressed in 1973 in Humble Oil & Refin23
ing Co. v. Doerr:'
By taking such option here, Humble [the mortgagee] put itself in the fortunate position where it had nothing to lose and
much to gain - it was not obliged to do anything but it could
exercise the option if the value of the property increased sufficiently over the option price to make it financially worthwhile to do so. The Rokitas [the mortgagor] could only lose
- the harder they worked to build up the business, and the
more the property increased in value, the 24more it was in the
interest of Humble to exercise the option. 1
To sum up, before we overrule some four hundred years of legal history, we ought to make a better case than that presently
stated for doing so. Indeed, we better be sure that we want to
make the case.125 Are we truly prepared to permit lenders to have
122In re Edwards, II L.R.
12 303 A.2d. 898 (1973).
24

367, 369 (1861).

1d. at 911.
that Professor Nickles does not want to make such a case. He states:
[lff I am wrong and these cases that threaten creditor control do have a
net economic cost, that alone is not sufficient reason to disapprove of
them. Balanced against the economic costs of limiting creditor control is

1251suspect
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all the advantages of a creditor and, in addition, the advantages of
ownership when that is profitable, but to be subject to none of the
burdens or none of the risks of ownership when the enterprise is
not profitable?
ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS

So far, the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have limited this dual position (creditor status
plus ownership rights if debtor prospers) to the secured creditor,
i.e., the one who loans on the security of the debtor's property.
But, in principle, why should it end there? If Restatement Section
3.1(c) and Section 211 of the ULSIA make sense for the secured
creditor, why not something comparable for the unsecured creditor? Why should not these unsecured creditors, like sellers of
goods, people who render service, etc., be entitled to write into
their contracts that they be paid the full amount of their debt plus
having an interest in the debtor's enterprise if it is profitable?
Indeed, if the principles announced in the Restatement and the
ULSIA are acceptable, why would any investor ever purchase
ownership (equity) interests in property or an enterprise? To do so
subjects that investor to the obligations of ownership, plus the risk
of loss if the property loses value or if the enterprise fails. Instead,
following the principles of the Restatement and the ULSIA, the
investment can be structured as a loan - better still a secured loan
- with the right to obtain an ownership interest at little or no additional cost, but only if the property increases in value or the enterprise proves to be profitable.
Thus, if the enterprise fails, the loan, particularly a secured
loan, has a very good chance of being repaid in full. On the other
hand, if the enterprise succeeds, then the loan is still fully repaid,
but the lender now becomes an owner of what is appreciated property of a profitable enterprise that has been obtained at little or no
cost. That ownership interest may be immediately liquidated to
"lock-in" these additional profits. Or, the appreciated property or
profitable enterprise ownership may be retained for potentially

the social cost of allowing it: subjecting debtors to an overt form of economic slavery or, put more mildly, transforming debtor-creditor relations
into investment robotization where the debtor's will is subjugated, willynilly, to that of the creditor .... It is undemocratic; it is exploitation; it
ensures the concentration of wealth; it is wrong.
Nickles, supra note 107, at 385.
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even higher gains, but with the assurance that only the minimum
cost, if any, to obtain the ownership is at risk.
These are the scenarios that the ideas contained in the ULSIA
and the Restatement make possible. They are not hypothetical
scenarios. They have already taken place. Recall the TIAA-CREF
examples previously discussed. Because of the potentially high
gains which are possible, it seems likely that more lenders and
investors, unless restrained by the anti-clogging rules, will seek to
take this approach. And what then might be the end result of all
this? It could be a significant diminishment of our current method
of lending and investing funds, where one acts either as a creditor
or owner. This will be replaced by the blended creditor equity
participation arrangements which are so favorable to the investors,
and which the ULSIA and the Restatement could make possible.
EPILOGUE
Are we really prepared to bury those equitable principles that
made mortgage law unique, by recognizing that a mortgage, at
bottom, is essentially a debtor-creditor relationship, not one of
property purchase? Or do we wish now to announce that mortgage
law is dead? Or, to use French (where this all started) to announce: La Mort Du Mortgage!- the Death of the Dead Pledge?
Will mortgage law survive? The answer to this question is
now for us to decide.

